Guide · Updated 2026
Second-person review when the workstation is offline
On a networked system, review is a workflow state in the software. On an isolated instrument PC it is often a person leaning over a colleague's shoulder, and afterwards a signature on a printout that is filed somewhere else. The check happened; the evidence is thin.
Written by Taha Bayar, a biologist working on laboratory data handover.
What makes a review record hold up
- It names the exact object. "Batch 41 reviewed" is weaker than a record bound to the hash of the result file.
- It distinguishes roles. Produced, reviewed, released are different acts by different people. One signature at the end loses that.
- It keeps the order. A review that happened after release is not a review. If the record cannot show order, it cannot show that.
- It survives the workstation. Evidence stored only on the instrument PC dies with the disk, the rebuild or the retirement of the instrument.
- It can be checked later without the tool that made it. Otherwise you have swapped one dependency for another.
The common patterns, and what each costs
| Pattern | What it gives | What it costs |
|---|---|---|
| Paper signature on a printout | Familiar, accepted, works offline | Not bound to the file bytes; storage and retrieval are manual |
| Instrument software user accounts | Inside the validated system, often has an audit trail | Only covers what that software does; shared logins are common on old systems |
| Review recorded in the LIMS after transfer | Central, searchable | Records the LIMS entry, not the handover; the gap stays unproven |
| Signed approval chain travelling with the file | Bound to the content, ordered, portable | Needs key management and a habit change |
How Kionel records it
Approvals are signed links, each one over the previous: produced, then reviewed, then released. Because each link covers the one before it, the order is provable and removing a link breaks the chain rather than silently shortening it. The approvals travel with the file, so the evidence arrives where the result arrives.
The honest boundary: a signature proves that a key signed, not that a person did. Tying keys to people is your identity process and, where it matters, hardware-backed device identity. We say the same thing on the security page.